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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Federal Income Taxation-Deferral of Prepaid Income
In American Auto Ass'n v. United States,' the United States
Supreme Court held that a taxpayer on the accrual basis may not
defer prepaid membership dues over the period of membership, but
must include such receipts as income in the year of receipt. The
Association received membership dues for a twelve month period,
payable in advance. Membership commenced or might be renewed
in any month of the year. For many years, the Association had
employed an accrual method of accounting and the calendar year as
its taxable year.' The dues were treated on the Associations' books
of account as income received ratably over the twelve month membership period. In the year of receipt the Association reported as
income only that portion of the dues applicable to the calendar year
during which the dues were collected. The balance was recognized
as income in the ensuing calendar year.3
The Commissioner, acting pursuant to section 41 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939,' rejected the Associations' method of accounting and substituted a method of his own. He claimed that the Associations' method did not properly reflect its income for tax purposes.
Section 41 required a taxpayer to compute his income on an annual
basis in accordance with the method of accounting which he regularly employed, but provided that if no method was regularly used,
or if the method used did not clearly reflect income, the computation
would be made in accordance with such method as in the opinion of
the Commissioner clearly reflected his income. Section 42 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939' required all items of income to be
included in the gross income for the taxable year in which they were
received by the taxpayer, unless, under section 41, they were to be
properly accounted for as of a different period.
When sections 41 and 42 are read together, it seems clear that
1367 U.S. 687 (1961).
'The Association had used the accrual method since 1932.
During the years of 1952 and 1953, the Association reported as income
one-twelfth of the dues received for each month of membership occurring
in the year of receipt.
'53 Stat. 24 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 446).
'53 Stat. 24 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 451).
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the Commissioner is given no discretion to reject a taxpayer's regularly employed accounting method so long as it clearly reflects his
income. Therefore, the critical question to be determined in a case
such as the present one is whether the taxpayer's method clearly
reflects income. But in the principal case the Court seems to have
brushed aside this question and proceeded to decide when the income
in question should be reported for tax purposes without regard to the
taxpayer's accounting system or accepted accounting practice.
In disallowing the deferral of income, the Commissioner has traditionally taken the position that such a method is in conflict with
the "claim of right" doctrine. This doctrine was first announced
in North American Oil Consol. v. Burnet.6 The Court in that case
said,
If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and
without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required to return, even though it may still
be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and
even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its
equivalent.
The cases relying on this doctrine, with the exception of Automobile
Club of Michigan v, Commissioner,7 have dealt with earned rather
than unearned income, and the only question was when this earned
income should be reported for tax purposes.' The case announcing
the doctrine had nothing to do with the determination of whether a
method of accounting was valid or invalid and it should have no
weight in deciding a case of the present type.
Four circuits have held that the claim of right doctrine may not
be used to compel a taxpayer to report unearned income in the year
of receipt. The tenth circuit held, in Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner,' that a magazine publisher could defer prepaid subscription income over the duration of the subscription period. In 1956
8286 U.S. 417 (1932).
7353 U.S. 180 (1957).
In the case announcing the claim of right doctrine, there was no dispute
but that the income was already earned. No case was found, except Automobile Club of Michigan, in which the Supreme Court relied on the doctrine
to reject a taxpayer's method of accounting, and it is not clear that it was
relied on in that case.
'218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 455, now
provides that publishers may defer prepaid subscription income when the
subscription period extends beyond the taxable year of receipt.
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the fifth circuit had occasion to decide whether prepaid income from
contracts to service heating furnaces sold by the taxpayer must be
reported in the year of receipt. That court found, in Schuessler v.
Commissioner,0 that the accrual method of accounting more accurately portrayed the taxpayer's income than the one selected by the
Commissioner because it matched income against expenses of the
period in which the income was earned and was incident to earning
that income, rather than against expenses of the period in which the
income was received and without regard to when'the income was
earned. More recently, the second circuit held, in Bressner Radio,
Inc. v. Commissioner," that prepaid income from television servicing
contracts could be deferred over the length of the obligation to furnish service. In 1960 the eighth circuit, in Schlude v. Commis2 held that a taxpayer who operated a dancing school could
sioner,"
defer prepaid tuition over the period of instruction covered by the
contract where the obligation to furnish instruction extended beyond
the taxable year of receipt. In upholding the taxpayers deferral, all
four circuits noted that the taxpayer was deferring unearned income
until a period in which it could be matched with expenses incurred
incident to earning the income.' 3 Since this is the objective to be
achieved by any sound accrual accounting system, it seems that these
courts were on sound footing.
In the present case the government had successfully relied upon
the claim of right doctrine in the Court of Claims." Upon appeal
to the Supreme Court, the government switched its argument to
the annual accounting requirement found in section 41 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939.15
10 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956).
11267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959).
12283 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1960), rev'd per curiam, 367 U.S. 911 (1961).

The reversal was based upon the decision in the principal case.
" The Association had a more difficult task in proving its system of
accounting properly matched future expenses with deferred income than did
the taxpayers in these cases. Substantially all services provided by the
Association were performed only on demand and were not limited to any
fixed dates, but were performed at any time requested by its members.
",181 F. Supp. 255 (Ct. Cl. 1960). The government did not rely on the

claim of right doctrine probably because four circuits had previously denied
that such ground may be used as a basis to deny a taxpayer the right to defer
prepayments. The Second, Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of

Appeal had previously held that the claim of right doctrine had no application in determining when to report prepaid unearned income, and allowed
accrual basis taxpayers to defer unearned income in accordance with their
regularly employed method of accounting.
1 53 Stat. 24 (now INT. Rav. CoDn oF 1954, § 446).
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The annual accounting requirement demands that neither income
nor deduction items be accelerated or postponed from one year to
another in order to reflect the long-term economic result of a particular transaction or group of transactions. However, as noted
by the dissent, most of the cases relied upon by the government as
a basis for this argument, involved cash basis taxpayers and none
of the decisions cited pertain to deferred reporting of wholly unearned income.' 6 Apparently this interpretation of the annual
accounting requirement stems from a rule laid down by the Tax
Court in Automobile Club of New York"7 to the effect that, "an item
of income cannot accrue for tax purposes after it has in fact been
received subject to the unrestricted use by the taxpayer."
The Supreme Court in the principal case did not base its decision
solely upon the annual accounting requirement. It seems to have
placed considerable weight on the fact that the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, as originally passed, contained specific provisions
allowing taxpayers to defer unearned, prepaid income to a tax period
later than that of receipt,' and to accrue expenses and deduct them
in the period during which they actually became due."" The Supreme
Court said that section 452 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
was not merely a statement of prior existing law, but that it was the
first specific acceptance of the deferral of prepaid, unearned income
for tax purposes. It further said that this provision was contrary to
existing law, and that its repeal was an indication that Congress
intended to restore the law to its status prior to the enactment of
this section and not to allow this type deferral. As the income in
question was for 1952 and 1953, it seems that action taken by Congress in 1954 and 1955 should have no bearing on the decision in
the present case. The Court did not mention section 446 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which specifically recognizes the
accrual method of accounting as acceptable for computing income
for tax purposes.
16 In Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931), the Court
took note that the taxpayer had not attempted to take advantage of the accrual method under which system the treatment in question would have been
allowed. In Security Mills Flour Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944),
the taxpayer had not applied consistently either a cash or accrual method;
Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934), involved an attempt by an accrual
basis taxpayer to accrue an expense that was highly contingent.
1732 T.C. 906, 913 (1959). (Emphasis is by the court.)
ITNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, ch. 1, § 452, 68A Stat. 152.
19 INT. RFv. CODE F
1954, ch. 1, § 462, 68A Stat. 158.
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The Supreme Court also placed some reliance on Automobile
Club of Michigan. In that case the sixth circuit relied on the claim
of right doctrine in affirming the Commissioner's disallowance of
the taxpayer's deferral of prepaid membership dues. The Supreme
Court did not specifically rely on the doctrine, but said, in affirming
the circuit court in that case, that the taxpayer's method of accounting was "purely artificial" so far as the record before the Court
showed. Apparently this was because there was no proof that the
Automobile Club's method of accounting properly matched income
with the expenses incurred which were incident to the earning of the
income. This would seem to indicate that the Supreme Court would
be willing to allow a taxpayer to defer income if he could show that
his method of accounting clearly reflected income. In the instant
case, there was expert accounting testimony that supported the Ass(?ciation's method, and the hearing commissioner found that the taxpayer's method clearly reflected income,20 yet the Supreme Court
still refused to allow the deferral.
The courts have been, until recently, more favorable to the accrual basis taxpayer who accrued expenses and deducted them in
a period prior to the tax period in which they were actually paid.
This situation is analogous to the deferral of unearned income and
it was also controlled by section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939. An early case in which the Supreme Court considered this
problem is United States v. Anderson.2 1 That case involved an
accrual basis taxpayer who attempted to deduct munitions taxes in
the taxable period during which they actually were assesed and became due. The basis of the tax was sales made by the taxpayer in
the previous tax period. The Court held that the taxes accrued as
the sales were made and could not be deducted in the following
period because the true income could not have been determined
without deducting from gross income for the year the total cost and
expenses attributable to the production of that income during the
year. In construing sections 12(a) and 13(d) of the Revenue Act
of 1916,2 which were similar to section 41 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, the Court said of the purpose of the act,
It was to enable taxpayers to keep their books and make their
returns according to scientific accounting principles, by charg2

American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 693 n.5 (1961).

21269 U.S. 422 (1926).
" REv. Acr OF 1916, ch. 463, §§ 12(a) & 13(d), 39 Stat. 767, 771.
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ing against income earned during the taxable period, the
expenses incurred in and properly attributable to the process
of earning income during that period; and indeed, to require
the tax return to be made on that basis, if the taxpayer failed
or was unable to make the return on a strict receipts and disbursements basis.
The appellee's true income for 1916 could not have been
determined without deducting from its gross income for the
year the total cost and expenses attributable to the production
of that income during the year.23
The Court there held that the tax must be deducted in 1916 or not
at all. It said that this was true regardless of the fact that the tax
was assessed and paid in 1917, since it was based on sales made in
1916, and that it made no difference that the taxpayer did not know
until the assessment the amount of the munitions tax.
If a taxpayer's books are to clearly reflect his income, as required
by section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, he must record
and report his expenses and income according to the same method
of accounting. Therefore, if a taxpayer is required to deduct expenses only in the year of accrual, it seems that he should be required to recognize his income only in the year during which it is
earned. But the Supreme Court seems to have a double standard in
requiring an expense to be accrued and deducted regardless of
whether it has been paid, and at the same time refusing to allow a
deferral of prepaid income. It follows that a taxpayer may be required to keep two different sets of books, one for income tax purposes, and another for reporting to stockholders and governmental
agencies. The Tax Court in National Airlines, Inc.24 recognized
that the requirement of keeping two different sets of books may
constitute a hardship on the taxpayer, but that court said the remedy
was not to be furnished by the judiciary.
Congress has in effect overruled the decision in the present case
as applied to certain membership organizations which are organized
without capital stock. In 1961 Congress passed a statute25 which
allows qualified organizations to spread prepaid membership dues
income ratably over the period during which there is a liability to
-2269
U.S. at 440.
2fl9

T.C. 159, 162 (1947).

IxNT. REv. CODE

op 1954, § 456.
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perform services. The period of such liability must extend beyond
the year of receipt, but must not be in excess of three years. Those
taxpayers who cannot qualify under this statute may still be able to
defer reporting of prepaid unearned income by proving that there is
a reasonable correlation between the income deferred and future
expenses. Such a conclusion seems to be justified as the Supreme
Court in the principal case placed considerable reliance upon the
Automobile Club of Michigan case.
RoBERT

L. GuNN

Pleadings-Cross-Claim for Contribution
In Greene v. Charlotte Chem. Labs., Inc.,' plaintiff sued to recover damages for personal injuries, joining A and B as alleged
joint tort-feasors. A filed a cross-claim against B setting up a plea
for contribution. B moved to strike the cross-claim. The trial court
allowed the motion. On appeal this was affirmed in a four to three
decision.'
The most obvious and severe consequence of this decision is to
preclude an original defendant in such an action from holding another
original defendant in to defend against his contribution claim should
plaintiff take a voluntary or suffer an involuntary nonsuit against him
at any time prior to judgment.' It thereby adds yet another complexity to an already intricate and still evolving pattern of rules in our
multiple party pleading practice.4
1254

N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82 (1961).

Justice Moore wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Win-

borne, Justices Denny and Higgins concurred. Justice Bobbitt dissented,
joined by Justices Parker and Rodman. Subsequently, in Bass v. Lee, 255
N.C. 73, 120 S.E.2d 570 (1961), the court reaffirmed this position with only

Justice Bobbitt dissenting.
'This consequence was frankly recognized by the majority opinion which
stated the question presented and answer in this form: "In an action against
two defendants, as joint tort-feasors, may one defendant set up a plea for
contribution against the co-defendant and thereby preclude dismissal of the
co-defendant during the trial and before judgment.... The answer is 'No."
254 N.C. at 691, 120 S.E.2d at 90.
' See Brandis & Graham, Recent Developments in the Field of Permissive
Joinder of Partiesand Causes in North Carolina,34 N.C.L. REv. 405, 419-22,
425-29 (1956); BRAiNDIs, A Plea for Adoption by North Carolina of the
Federal Joinder Rules, 25 N.C.L. REv. 245, 260-68 (1947); BRANDIS, Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina,25 N.C.L. REv. 1
(1946).
In these articles the authors review the decisions of the North
Carolina Supreme Court in an effort to formulate the rules regarding multiple party pleading. From the cases discussed therein and more recent decisions of the court, the rules pertaining to cross-claim for contribution prior
to Greene appear to be as follows: (a) Prior to the enactment of G.S. § 1-240
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Bell v. Lacey,5 the case relied upon by the majority,' seems clearly
distinguishable.' Therein the objectionable cross-claim was for
(contribution statute) the rule was recognized that under G.S. § 1-222 a
defendant,' upon allegations of primary liability of his codefendant, could
cross-claim against the codefendant and demand judgment over against him
for the full amount recovered by plaintiff. Gregg v. City of Wilmington, 155
N.C. 18, 70 S.E. 1070 (1911). This rule was extended to allow joinder of
a third party upon allegations of -primary liability by the original defendant.
Bowman v. City of Greensboro, 190 N.C. 611, 130 S.E. 502 (1925). (b) G.S.
§ 1-240 gives the joint tort-feasors the substantive right of contribution from
each other and when sued alone, to have other joint tort-feasors made additional parties so that the contribution issue may be settled in one cause.
(c) The original defendant must allege facts sufficient to indicate that both
defendants are or may be liable to plaintiff and that plaintiff could claim
rights against the party added by timely assertions. Thus where he alleges
only that the negligence of another was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries, the cross-action against such other person will not be sustained.
Potter v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 242 N.C. 67, 86 S.E.2d 780 (1955).
(d) An additional party may not be joined for contribution when his negligence would be attributable to plaintiff and bar plaintiff's action. Evans v.
Johnson, 225 N.C. 238, 34 S.E.2d 73 (1945). (e) Where the original defendant has another joint tort-feasor joined for contribution, the joined
party may cross-claim against the original defendant for damages for personal injuries arising out of the same accident. Norris v. Johnson, 246 N.C.
179, 97 S.E.2d 773 (1957). But where both tort-feasors are sued jointly by
plaintiff, neither may file a cross-claim for affirmative relief against his
codefendant, even though the cross-claimant has a cross-claim for contribution filed against him by the codefendant. Bell v. Lacey, 248 N.C. 703, 104
S.E.2d 833 (1958).
(f) Where two defendants are sued together as joint
tort-feasors and one demurs successfully to the complaint and is dismissed
from the action prior to trial, he may be made an additional party defendant
by the remaining defendant under G.S. § 1-240. Canestrino v. Powell, 231
N.C. 190, 56 S.E.2d 566 (1949). (g) Where two defendants are sued together as joint tort-feasors, and plaintiff takes a voluntary nonsuit as to one
during trial, he is ordered retained to answer to a cross-claim for contribution
filed by the other defendant. Smith v. Kappas, 218 N.C. 758, 12 S.E.2d 693
(1941), same case on rehearing, 219 N.C. 850, 15 S.E.2d 375 (1941).
Greene overrules Smith without comment by the majority opinion, and
applies instead the rule of Bell which involved a cross-claim for affirmative
relief, not contribution. Greene also casts doubt upon the rule announced in
Canestrino. (See text infra.) Quaere: Considering the rule in Greene, what
results when plaintiff sues two defendants as joint tort-feasors, one demurs
successfully and plaintiff fails to amend or appeal but defendant files no
motion to dismiss the cause as to him, thus remaining a nominal party? May
remaining defendant maintain a cross-claim for contribution here? See Webb
v. Eggleston, 228 N.C. 574, 46 S.E.2d 700 (1948), where the court states
that such inaction by the plaintiff will work a dismissal of the successful
defendant, and Dudley v. Dudley, 250 N.C. 95, 107 S.E.2d 918 (1959), stating that defendant has a right to move for dismissal, which seems to suggest
that dismissal is not automatic in such a case.
It is doubtful if Greene will upset any of the rules formulated under G.S.
§ 1-222 dealing with indemnity or primary and secondary liability.
248 N.C. 703, 104 S.E.2d 833 (1958).
'The court stated: "The question was definitely and clearly decided in
Bell v. Lacey. . . ." 254 N.C. at 691, 120 S.E.2d at 90.
This is the argument advanced by Justice Bobbitt in dissenting. He
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affirmative relief rather than for contribution. Cross-claiins for
affirmative relief have consistently been forbidden on the basis that
they present matter not "germane to plaintiff's cause, of action," 8 and
on the kindred basis, apparently seen as a corollary, that "an original defendant ... [cannot] compel the plaintiff to join issue with

a defendant he has not elected to sue."9 However justifiable under
code pleading practice these propositions may be in application to
cross-claims for affirmative relief,"0 they 'would appear inapplicable
to a cross-claim for contribution.
Cross-claims for contribution between original and impleaded
codefendants are of course widespread in practice and sanctioned by
the court.' There is no suggestion that they might be prohibited
by a requirement that they be germane to plaintiff's cause.'" To
the contrary, it is frequently pointed out that a defendant asserting
such a claim must recover, if at all, upon the liability of his 'code1
fendant to him and not on the strength'of .the plaintiff's c6ase. 3'
stated that Bell is not authoritr for the proposition that a defendant'may not
allege that his codefendant is a joint tort-feasor from whom he is entitled
to contribution. It is interesting to note that the only cross-claim for contribution in Bell was not objected to by the plaintiff or the codefendant, or
contested on appeal.
'Montgomery v. Blades, 217 N.C. 654, 656, 9 S.E.2d 397, 398 (1940).
Apparently the cross-claim for affirmative relief was pleaded in contemplation of Norris v. Johnson, 246 N.C. 179, 97 S.E.2d 773 (1957), where a
cross-claim for affirmative relief by a third party, joined by the original defendant for contribution, was allowed. Justice Bobbitt, in dissenting in
Greene, stated that the court in Bell was simply refusing to extend this rule
to a case where plaintiff sued both defendants.
' Bell v. Lacey, 248 N.C. 703, 705, 104 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1958). See also
Denny v. Coleman, 245 N.C. 90, 95 S.E.2d 352 (1956) ; Charnock v. Taylor,
223 N.C. 360, 26 S.E.2d 911 (1943). Contra, Anx. STAT. ANN. § 34-1007
(1947). This statute provides that upon joinder of the additional defendant,
the plaintiff shall amend his pleadings to assert against the third party defendant any claim which the plaintiff might have asserted against him had,
he been originally joined.
"'Their applicability even here has not been consistently seen by the
court which has held that an additional defendant, joined by an original defendant upon a cross-claim for contribution, may cross-claim against the

original defendant for affirmative relief with no suggestion that such a cross-

claim is not germane to plaintiff's cause.

The cross-claim is held to be

justified, over the objection of the original defendant, because he is respon-

sible for the cross-claimant's presence in the case. Norris v. Johnson, 246
N.C. 179, 97 S.E.2d 773 (1957).
I E.g., Norris v. Johnson, 246 N.C. 179, 97 S.E.2d 773 (1957) ; Godfrey v.
Tidewater Power Co., 223 N.C. 647, 27 S.E.2d 736 (1943); Mangum v.
185 S.E. 644 (1936).
Southern Ry., 210 N.C. 134, supra.
12 See cases cited note 11
13
Potter v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 242 N.C. 67, 86 S.E.2d 780 (1955);
Canestrino v. Powell, 231 N.C. 190, 56 S.E.2d 566 (1949).
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Thus the lack of relation of the contribution claim to the plaintiff's
cause has consistently been emphasized rather than deplored where
contribution is sought between original and impleaded codefendants.
The objection that the practice would allow an original defendant
to compel a plaintiff to join issue with a defendant whom he has not
elected to sue appears equally inapplicable to the contribution crossclaim.14 There is nothing inherent in the assertion of such a crossclaim which would preclude a plaintiff from taking a voluntary nonsuit as to the other defendant at any time; nor which would compel
him to proceed to trial against such codefendant in the first instance;
nor, having done so, would compel him to introduce evidence, or
press for judgment; nor, having secured judgment, would compel
him to enforce it by execution. 5 Instead, upon nonsuit, either voluntary or involuntary, against such codefendant, the codefendant should
then become defendant as to the cross-claim for contribution alone
and retained in the action to meet the cross-claiming defendant's
proof of this separate claim.' 6

In Smith v. Kappas,17 decided in 1941 and neither discussed nor
"' No statute or decision in North Carolina states that plaintiff shall allege
a cause of action against a joint tort-feasor, joined for contribution by defendant; but quite the contrary, the principle is stated frequently that plaintiff may elect to sue all of the joint tort-feasors, or some of them and not
others. Tarkington v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., 230 N.C. 354, 53
S.E.2d 269 (1949). The defendant, seeking to recover contribution, must
do so on the strength of his own pleading and proof, not that of plaintiff.
Jones v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 253 N.C. 482, 117 S.E.2d 496 (1960). Quacre:
What results, under Greene, when plaintiff sues one joint tort-feasor; the
latter moves to add another as party defendant under a claim for contribution; plaintiff then seeks to amend his complaint so as to state a cause of
action against both defendants? Should he be given leave to amend, and if
so, will the cross-claim for contribution, pleaded prior to the amendment, be
stricken under Greene? Under such procedure, if sustained, the plaintiff
who does not wish to have contribution issues litigated in his cause is afforded
a method to defeat the very purpose of G.S. § 1-240. Also, Greene may
create an incentive by plaintiffs to sue all joint tort-feasors, then take a nonsuit as to one on trial, again rendering G.S. § 1-240 ineffective to accomplish
the purpose for which it was intended, i.e., to have the contribution issue
settled in the same cause and avoid multiplicity of suits.
" This was indicated by the court in Mangum v. Southern Ry., 210 N.C.
134, 185 S.E. 644 (1936), wherein the court stated that the plaintiff cannot
be affected by the procedure of original defendants bringing in another party
as joint tort-feasor for contribution. Plaintiff has the right to prosecute his
suit to final decision in his own way.
" See Greene v. Charlotte Chem. Labs., Inc., 254 N.C. 680, 696, 120
S.E.2d 82, 93 (1961), wherein Justice Bobbitt suggests the procedure to be
followed in cases of the kind under discussion.
'218 N.C. 758, 12 S.E.2d 693 (1941). On rehearing of this case it was
found that the amended answer alleging the cross-claim for contribution
against the excused defendant was not filed until after the verdict in plain-
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cited in the majority opinion of Greene, the precise practice forbidden by Greene was directly sustained and successfully utilized to
hold an original codefendant in, after voluntary nonsuit, to meet a
cross-claim for contribution. Presumably, the trial bench and bar,
until Greene, lived by Smith.
Besides imposing a new rule in the Smith-Greene procedural
setting, Greene creates an anomaly when contrasted with another
closely related procedural situation. In Canestrino v. Powell,1 8 decided in 1949, plaintiff sued A and B; B successfully demurred to
the complaint, and when plaintiff failed to amend or appeal, B's
motion to dismiss as to him was sustained. A then cross-claimed
for contribution against B, and'moved to have him brought back
into the case. This motion was granted and the cross-claim sustained against B's demurrer terefo,19 despite the now final adjudication of B's non-liability to the plaintiff. Thus, considering Canestrino and Greene together, an original defendant may bring back
into the action for possible contribution an original codefendant who
has successfully established his non-liability to plaintiff by demurrer.
However, he cannot hold one in who, prior to any adjudication of
his liability to plaintiff, challenges directly, the cross-claim for
contribution.20
tiff's cause, nor did the remaining defendant request that the excused defendant be joined as a third party defendant under the contribution statute
until after the verdict. Upon this discovery, the court overruled defendant's
objection to plaintiff's voluntary nonsuit as to the codefendant. Smith v.
Kappas, 219 N.C. 850, 15 S.E.2d 375 (1941).
18231 N.C. 190, 56 S.E.2d 566 (1949).
See Yandell v. National Fireproofing Corp., 239 N.C. 1, 79 S.E.2d 223
(1953), where the same procedure, as used in Canestrino, was used and
expressly approved on appeal. In a comparable situation, a Pennsylvania
court refused to dismiss the codefendant in the first instance, stating that it
would be idle for the court to approve a discontinuance that could not stand.
Its only effect would be to add to the procedural burdens of the defendant
and subject him to unreasonable delay and expense. Dice v. Marsolino, 14
Pa. D. & C.2d 457 (C.P. of Fayette County 1958).
"0The court in Bell v. Lacey, 248 N.C. 703, 104 S.E.2d 833 (1958),
stated the general rule that if an original defendant avails himself of the
provisions of the contribution statute, he cannot rely upon any liability of the
party, whom he has brought in, to the original plaintiff, but must recover, if
at all, upon the liability of such party to him. Thus the prerequisite for
contribution is not action by the plaintiff against the joint tort-feasor but
recovery by the plaintiff against the original defendant. Curiously enough
in both Bell and Greene where the court emphasizes the rights of the plaintiff and attempts to protect his cause of action from interference by defendant's pleadings, the objections came, not from the plaintiff, but from the
codefendant. With the exception of Bass v. Lee, 255 N.C. 73, 120 S.E.2d
570 (1961), where both the plaintiff and the defendant to the cross-claim
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, 'The 'practical alternative to the :procedure forbidden in Greene.
is: a. separate action, which has distinct disadvantages. Often two.
jury .trials are.required where one would have sufficed. The claimant
for .cpnt-ribution is forced to run the risk of losing testimony by
death, lapse of memory, or removal of witnesses from the jurisdiction of the court: Further, these witnesses are often the same ones
who testified in.the original action and their inconvenience in being
summoned again should be considered. All this leads to a delay in
t erepovery, of! contribution, increases the work load of the courts,
multiplies the cost of litigation for the state as well as the parties
to .the issue, of contribution. .Also, the plaintiff may be compelled
to wait longer for his money since a joint tort-feasor, when sued
alone, may pay the.recovery to a trustee until the issue of contributioni settled in the separate action,21
This.and.other anomalies, present in our multiple party practice,
arise fromn the completely inadequate statutory basis upon which 'our
coprt has had to construct, step .by.step, our rules in this area. North
Qaroina.has no statute which prescribes the procedure for crossclaims.between original defendants," or with the impleading of new
defendants.23 Our contribution statute deals essentially with the
iu&stantive riiht to cbntribiition. fIt also contains, however, ambiguously worded procedural provisions which clearly contemplate
objected, in each case discussed and cited herein the plaintiff has raised no
objections to the cross-claim.
"N.C. GEN,: STAT. § 1-240 (f953).

-Cross-claims, where appropriate, are deemed sanctioned by N.C. GEN.
§ 1-222 (1953), which reads: "1. Judgment may be given for or against
one or, more of several plaintiffs, and for or against one or more of several
defendants; and it may determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each
side, as between themselves. 2. It may grant to the defendant any affirma"
Since this statute does not
tive relief to.which he may be entitled ...
expressly state the nature of cross-claims allowable, the court has had to
define8 them; hence the rule against cross-claims for affirmative relief.
Impleading of new defendants, other than for contribution, e.g., for
indemnity, are likewise allowed under G.S. § 1-222. Here again the court
has applied the no affirmative relief rule in the absence of specific provisions
in the statute as to what may be the subject of a claim against an impleaded
defendant, but claims for indemnity are held not to involve claims for affirmative relief in this context. Gregg v. City of Wilmington, 155 N.C. 18, 70
S.E. 1070 (1911). This is founded on the basis that a claim for indemnity
relates to plaintiff's claim and is based upon an adjustment of it. Wright's
Clothing Store v. Ellis Stone & Co., 233 N .C. 126, 63 S.E.2d 118 (1951).
In the latter case the court recognized the principle that adjustment of plaintiff's claim by defendant's pleadings for indemnity against his codefendant
springs from equity, apart from the statutory right of contribution or indemnity among joint tort-feasors. This principle implies that the court
recognizes contribution as .being "an adjustment of plaintiff's claim."
STAT.
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impleading new defendants for contribution,, but, not so clearly the
type of cross-claim between original defendants forbidden -by
Greene.2" Our court has thus been forced to-use statutes ill-adapted
to the necessities of multiple party litigation,25 so that the results of
specific decisions are frequently beyond criticism as interpretative of
the ill-suited statute perforce utilized.2 6 What is needed is a completely new set of statutes or court rules dealing specifically, and as
such, with cross-claims between original parties and with impleading
of new parties. Such statutes should define the extent to which each
may be utilized for asserting claims for affirmative relief, for contribution, or for indemnity."
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
approach the problem precisely in this direct manner and are couched
in clear language which would avoid the constructional difficulties
raised by our statutes.2
", N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 1-240 (1953), after providing that each joint tort-

feasor shall pay his proportionate share of the judgment, states: "[I]n the
event the judgment was obtained in an action arising out of a joint tort, and
only one, or not all of the joint tort-feasors, were made parties defendant,
those tort-feasors made parties defendant, and against whom judgment was

obtained, may, in an action therefor, enforce contribution from the other

joint tort-feasors; or at any time before judgment is obtained, the joint tortfeasors made parties defendant may, upon motion, have the other joint tortfeasors made parties defendant." The phrase "only one, or not all," as used
here, should apply to the procedural aspect of third party- practice and not
to the substantive right of contribution nor its enforcement when third party
practice is made unnecessary by plaintiff suing all of the joint tort-feasors.
Most jurisdictions, which allow contribution, have separated the substantive
rights and the procedural rules of enforcing it in their statutes. E.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1002, -1007 (1947), as amended, ARK. STAT. ANN: § 341002 (Supp. 1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 263.15, 272.59-.61 (1957). See also
Northwest Motors, Inc. v. Creekmore, 229 Ark. 755, 318 S.W.2d 614 (1958) ;
Rudolph v. Mundy, 226 Ark. 95, 288 S.W.2d 602 (1956). But see Camden
v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 239 Mo. App. 1199, 206 S.W.2d 699 (1947):.
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-222, -240 (1953).
See note 4 supra.
See Brandis, A Plea For Adoption By North Carolina Of The Federal
Joinder Rules, 25 N.C.L. REv. 245 (1947).
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (g) provides: "A pleading may state as a cross-claim
any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject matter
of the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant." " FED. R.
Civ. P. 13(h) provides: "When the presence of parties other than those to
the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the
determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them
to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction of
them can be obtained and their joinder will not deprive the court of jutisdiction of the action." FED. R. Civ. P. 14 sets out the procedure for third
party practice.
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Until such time as a new set of rules or statutes is adopted, however, the situation with respect to contribution pleading practice
appears to be as follows:
(1) where the plaintiff sues some but not all of the joint
tort-feasors, an original defendant may have the others joined
upon a plea for contribution against them ;29
(2) where the plaintiff sues all of the joint tort-feasors,
but one or more successfully demurs to the complaint and the
plaintiff fails to amend or appeal, the remaining defendants,
assuming they have adequate time, may have the defendants,
who were dismissed on demurrer, brought back into the action
upon a plea for contribution

;30

(3) where the plaintiff sues all of the joint tort-feasors,
even though plaintiff takes a voluntary, or suffers an involuntary nonsuit as to one of them, the remaining defendants cannot preclude his dismissal by pleading a cross-claim for contribution, but are relegated to a separate action in order to
settle the issue of contribution."1
HIRAM

A.

BERRY

Torts-Blasting-Basis of Liability: Negligence, Trespass or Absolute
Liability
No less than twenty-five years have elapsed since the problem
of damages caused by blasting operations has reached the North
Carolina Supreme Court. During this period, however, much litigation has arisen in this area of tort law elsewhere in the country,
and a reasonable prediction would be that the next case in North
Carolina will result in a new development in the law of this state.
The prime question facing the courts in this field concerns the
proper basis of liability for harm occasioned by the use of explosives
in blasting. Theoretically, there are three theories open to those
courts which remain uncommitted on this issue. They are: (1)
recovery should always depend upon proof of negligence or fault;
(2) the action should be one of trespass following the common law
concept of strict liability for trespass to land; and (3) the defendant
v. Johnson, 246 N.C. 179, 97 S.E.2d 773 (1957).
Yandell v. National Fireproofing Corp., 239 N.C. 1, 79 S.E.2d 223
(1953); Canestrino v. Powell, 231 N.C. 190, 56 S.E.2d 566 (1949).
"' Bass v. Lee, 255 N.C. 73, 120 S.E.2d 570 (1961) ; Greene v. Charlotte
Chem. Labs., Inc., 254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82 (1961).
9Norris

0
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should be absolutely liable on the ground that public policy demands
that he stand as an insurer of any injury resulting from the operation
of an extrahazardous activity.
As a practical matter, it is generally agreed that an action of
trespass may be maintained where rocks and debris are thrown upon
the plaintiff's land' or against his person ' by blasting. The majority
of jurisdictions,3 recently joined by South Carolina4 and West Virginia,5 also impose liability, irrespective of negligence, when the
plaintiff's domain is damaged by concussion waves and ground

vibrations.6 A minority of states,7 however, require proof of negli'E.g., Asheville Constr. Co. v. Southern Ry., 19 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1927);
Adams & Sullivan v. Sengel, 177 Ky. 535, 197 S.W. 974 (1917); Hay v.
Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (1849). Contra, requiring proof of negligence,
Bennett v. Texas-Illinois Gas Pipeline Co., 113 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Ark.
1953); Cashin v. Northern Pac. Ry., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862 (1934);
Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786
(1958).
'E.g., Welz v. Manzillo, 113 Conn. 674, 155 Atl. 841 (1931); Sullivan
v. Dunham, 161 N.Y. 290, 55 N.E. 923 (1900); Wells v. Knight, 32 R.I.
432, 80 Atl. 16 (1911). Contra, requiring negligence, Klepsch v. Donald,
4 Wash. 436, 30 Pac. 991 (1892).
'California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
'Wallace v. A. H. Guion & Co., 237 S.C. 349, 117 S.E.2d 359 (1960),
discussed in Note, 10 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 98 (1961). In the only other
blasting case in South Carolina, the court found sufficient evidence of negligence to carry the case to the jury. Harris v. Simon, 32 S.C. 593, 10 S.E.
1076 (1890). In a later case involving vibration damage caused by pile
driving, the court said the Harris case apparently required proof of negligence in the blasting cases. Momeier v. Koebig, 220 S.C. 124, 129, 66
S.E.2d 465, 467 (1951). The court in Wallace said that since the sole concern of the Harris appeal was the sufficiency of negligence, the case was distinguishable, no negligence being alleged here, and dismissed the reference
to the Harris rule in the Momeier decision as dictum. 237 S.C. at 355, 117
S.E.2d at 361-62.
'Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contracting Corp., 118 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va.
1961). Adoption of the rule of absolute liability by the West Virginia court
was largely predetermined by two federal decisions. Fairfax Inn, Inc. v.
Sunnyhill Mining Co., 97 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. W. Va. 1951); Britton v.
Harrison Constr. Co., 87 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. W. Va. 1948); and earlier
state cases containing strong undertones of strict liability. Wigal v. City
of Parkersburg, 74 W. Va. 25, 81 S.E. 554 (1914) ; Weaver Mercantile Co.
v. Thurmond, 68 W. Va. 530, 70 S.E. 126 (1911).
'E.g., Fairfax Inn, Inc. v. Sunnyhill Mining Co., supra note 5; Garden
of the Gods Village v. Hellman, 133 Colo. 286, 294 P.2d 597 (1956) ; Central
(1954); Thigpen v.
Exploration Co. v. Gray, 219 Miss. 757, 70 So. 2d 33
Skousen & Hise, 64 N.M. -290, 327 P.2d 802 (1958). " See generally Annot.,
20 A.L.R.2d 1372 (1951); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §§ 519-20 (1938).
'Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Texas.

NORTH CAROLINA ±AW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

gence8 in the latter situation unless a nuisance is shown.'
Courts imposing absolute liability rely upon one or all of the
following theories: (1) air waves or ground vibrations constitute
trespass;1O (2) one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity must
be held absolutely responsible because of the possibility of risk;"
(3) one must not use his property so as to injure that of another ;12
(4) these cases fall within the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher; or (5)
8 E.g., Ledbetter-Johnson v. Hawkins, 267 Ala. 458, 103 So. 2d 748
(1958); Cratty v. Samuel Aceto & Co., 151 Me. 126, 116 A.2d 623 (1955);
Dalton v. Demos Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 334 Mass. 377, 135 N.E.2d
646 (1956); Booth v. Rome, W. & 0. Terminal R.R., 140 N.Y. 267, 35 N.E.
592 (1893).
'Central Iron & Coal Co. v. Vandenheuk, 147 Ala. 546, 41 So. 145
(1906) (rock quarry); Benton v. Kerman, 127 N.J. Eq. 434, 13 A.2d 825
(Ct. Ch. 1940) (rock quarry); Dixon v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 293
N.Y. 509, 58 N.E.2d 517 (1944) (rock quarry), rehearing denied, 294 N.Y.
654, 60 N.E.2d 385 (1945).
"0"One [vibration or concussion] is as much a trespass as the other [rock
or debris]." Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contracting Corp., 118 S.E.2d 622,
626 (W. Va. 1961). See also Johnson v. Kansas City Terminal R.R., 182
Mo. App. 349, 170 S.W. 456 (1914); Hickey v. McCabe & Bihler, 30 R.I.
346, 75 Atl. 404 (1910).
" The theory is that by engaging in the ultrahazardous activity, the defendant necessarily exposes others to danger. A possibility of risk arises
from the dangerous character of the enterprise, which the defendant should
assume because he has introduced it into the community. Fairfax Inn, Inc. v.
Sunnyhill Mining Co., 97 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. W. Va. 1951); Britton v.
Harrison Constr. Co., 87 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. W. Va. 1948); Whitman Hotel
Corp. v. Elliott & Watrous Eng'r Co., 137 Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591 (1951).
It should be noted, however, that the risk here is not necessarily an unreasonable one giving rise to a likelihood or probability of injury, i.e., negligence. The reasonably prudent man would proceed with the blasting, but
stand as an insurer of any consequences resulting from its dangerous nature.
EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT § 15 (1951); ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS 40 (1941); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 14.7 (1956);
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 154 (1881); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 520(a),
comment a (1938).
The above cases further state the generally accepted idea that even absolute liability must be based upon some foreseeability of harm. See RESTATEThis foreseeability qualification to absolute
MENT, TORTS §519 (1938).
liability led Dean Prosser to conclude that the better rule would be to impose
absolute liability in urban or densely populated areas and require proof of
negligence in rural or relatively uninhabited localities. PROSSER, TORTS § 59
(2d ed. 1955). This is apparently the law in California. See Alonso v. Hills,
95 Cal. App. 2d 778, 214 P.2d 50 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950). Several other cases
have also discussed this dual concept. See particularly Boonville Collieries
Corp. v. Reynolds, 163 N.E. 627 (Ind. App. Ct. 1960) (reversing judgment
for failure to allege nature of surroundings).
" McGrath v. Basich Bros. Constr. Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 573, 46 P.2d 981
(Dist. Ct. App. 1935): Louden v. City of Cincinnati, 90 Ohio St. 144, 106
N.E. 970 (1914); Wallace v. A. H. Guion & Co., 237 S.C. 349, 117 S.E.2d
359 (1960).

See also BIGELOW, TORTS 466 (8th ed. 1907); Annot., 20

A.L.R.2d 1372, 1374 (1951).
that the person who for his own
"'We think that the true rule of law is,
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a nuisance is found.' 4
The minority of jurisdictions reply that (1) concussion or vibration damage is merely consequential, less than a physical invasion
of the plaintiff's premises, and therefore the action is properly and
historically one of trespass on the case as opposed to trespass; 15
(2) one has a right to the fullest reasonable use of his property, and
blasting is a lawful and reasonable use;16 and (3) public policy de7
mands proof of negligence.'
It should be manifest that this distinction drawn between rockdebris and concussion-vibration damage is unsound and that the
basis of liability should not turn upon the form of the force producing the injury. Both emanate from the same source and oftentimes damage caused by sudden vacuums in the air or waves through
the earth is much greater than that resulting from rocks passing
purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to
do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do
so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape ....

."

Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279 (1866),

af'd, Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 339-40 (1868). The rule has
been applied to the explosion of stored combustibles. Exner v. Sherman
Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931) ; Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St.
Marys Woolen Mfg. Co., 60 Ohio St. 560, 54 N.E. 528 (1899); and to
blasting. Miles v. Forest Rock Granite Co., 34 L.T.R. 500 (K.B. 1918);
Britton v. Harrison Constr. Co., 87 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. W. Va. 1948);
Colton v. Onderdonk, 69 Cal. 155, 10 Pac. 395 (1886). See PROSSER, The
Principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, in SErEcTED Topics ON THE LAw OF TORTS

135 14(1953).

E.g., Longtin v. Persell, 30 Mont. 306, 76 Pac. 699 (1904) ; Beecher v.
Dull, 294 Pa. 17, 143 Ad. 498 (1928); Gossett v. Southern Ry., 115 Tenn.
376, 89 S.W. 737 (1905).
- E.g., Ledbetter-Johnson v. Hawkins, 267 Ala. 458, 103 So. 2d 748
(1958); Dalton v. Demos Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 334 Mass. 377, 135
N.E.2d 646 (1956); Booth v. Rome, W. & 0. Terminal R.R., 140 N.Y. 267,
35 N.E. 592 (1893). Contra,Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d
510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931); Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott & Watrous Eng'r
Co., 137 Conn. 562, 570, 79 A.2d 591, 595 (1951): "The old technical rules of
common-law pleading with their finespun distinctions between forms of
action no longer obtain." See also 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 14.7 (1956) ;
PROSSEa, TORTS § 59 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 158, comment h

(1938).
6

" Reynolds v. W. H. Hinman Co., 145 Me. 343, 75 A.2d 802 (1950);
Booth v. Rome, W. & 0. Terminal R.R., supra note 15. The absolute liability decisions agree with this proposition, but require one who carries on
such activities to assume the risk of all consequences resulting therefrom.
"'E.g., Booth v. Rome, W. & 0. Terminal R.R., 140 N.Y. 267, 35 N.E.
592 (1893), reasoning that the rule of strict liability impedes the development
and improvement of property. Contra, Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott &
Watrous Eng'r Co., 137 Conn. 562, 569, 79 A.2d 591, 595 (1951): "Considerations of public policy do not require immunity from liability for damages caused by concussion or vibration any more than from liability for
damages caused by flying debris."
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through the plaintiff's roof. As the absolute liability decisions often
state, the distinction is nothing more than a holdover of the difference recognized at common law between the actions of trespass
and trespass on the case although forms of action are now abolished
under modem code pleading."8
Although the blasting problem has arisen in North Carolina no
less than a dozen times, 9 beginning with Blackwell v. Lynchburg
& D. R.R.2 ° seventy years ago, the court has never explicitly said
that proof of negligence is essential to recovery or that the theory
of absolute liability is unavailable.21 It is true that in the prior/
• See note 15 supra.
Sparks v. Tennessee Mineral Products Corp., 212 N.C. 211, 193 S.E.
31 (1937) ; Greer v. Callahan Constr. Co., 190 N.C. 632, 130 S.E. 739 (1925) ;
Cobb v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 175 N.C. 130, 95 S.E. 92 (1918) ; Wiggins
v. Hiawassee Valley Ry., 171 N.C. 773, 89 S.E. 18 (1916); Arthur v.
Henry, 157 N.C. 438, 73 S.E. 211 (1911); Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 393,
73 S.E. 206 (1911); Hunter v. Southern Ry., 152 N.C. 682, 68 S.E. 237
(1910) ; Settle v. Southern Ry., 150 N.C. 643, 64 S.E. 759 (1909) ; Kimberly
v. Howland, 143 N.C. 399, 55 S.E. 778 (1906) ; Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co.,
131 N.C. 536, 42 S.E. 983 (1902); Gates v. Latta, 117 N.C. 189, 23 S.E.
173 (1895).
I°I N.C. 151, 16 S.E. 12 (1892). Plaintiff's intestate, who had granted
an easement to defendant railroad, was struck and killed by a flying rock while
standing in his yard some distance from where defendant contractors were
blasting. The court affirmed a judgment for plaintiff, holding the contractors
negligent in failing to cover the blast or to give timely notice thereof. Other
cases have required a showing of negligence where blasting is conducted
on an easement granted by plaintiff on the theory that he is compensated
for all reasonable, necessary and natural incidents of the work contemplated
when he accepts the consideration. This acceptance bars his right to proceed in trespass. Gordon v. Elmore, 71 W. Va. 195, 76 S.E. 344 (1912);
Watts v. Norfolk & W. R.R., 39 W. Va. 196, 19 S.E. 521 (1894). The
North Carolina court in Blackwell said: "[T]he prudent use of such an
agency [blasting] ... is always deemed to have been in contemplation when
the damage was assessed for the right of way, as a necessity incident to the
rivilege. But where damage is done to the land of the owner adjacent to
hat within the condemned boundary, if it result from managing or handling
explosive material carelessly or unskillfully .

.

. the corporationis answerable

in a new action.... We do not think that the privilege of throwing stones
through the air two hundred or more yards and beyond the right of way...
passes .

.

. as a necessary incident to the easement."

111 N.C. at 153-55,

16 S.E. at 14-15. (Emphasis added.) Although the court did not expressly
say that an action in trespass could not be maintained, it seems clear from
the above that after the condemnation proceeding the defendant could only
be held answerable on a charge of negligence. The Blackwell case has been
repeatedly cited in later decisions, none of which involved easements, as
supporting the requirement of negligence. The distinction, once laid down,
was apparently overlooked in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Sparks v. Tennessee
Mineral Products Corp., 212 N.C. 211, 193 S.E. 31 (1937). See also language in Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 393, 73 S.E. 206 (1911), which implies
that if plaintiff had not consented to the use of a quarry, he might have
proceeded in trespass.
" There is no statute directly in point, but N.C. GEr. STAT. § 14-284.1
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cases involving damage caused by rock and debris22 as well as in the
single opinion dealing with concussion and vibration,2" the court,
without exception,24 has proceeded upon negligence.2 5 The explanation apparently lies in the fact that the court simply followed the
theory of plaintiffs' pleadings and proof. It would be refreshing
to see the next plaintiff's attorney phrase his complaint in terms of
absolute liability, or at least plead in the alternative with negligence,
and put it to the test of demurrer or a motion to strike.
In projecting upon the possibility that North Carolina will join
the majority of states applying absolute liability to all blasting, it will
be seen that the court has already taken a preliminary step in this
direction. Because of the dangerous character of the enterprise, one
who desires to carry on blasting activities may not escape liability
through an independent contractor2 6 or, as held in one case, a lessee.
It has also been held that not ordinary care but a high degree of
diligence is required of one conducting blasting operations. 2s How(c) (1953), concerning the sale ana storage of explosives, provides: "All
persons having dynamite or other powerful explosives in their possession or
under their control shall at all times keep such explosives in a safe and
secure manner .

. . ."

Quaere whether this language points to any basis of

liability for damage caused by blasting?
2E.g., Hunter v. Southern Ry., 152 N.C. 682, 68 S.E. 237 (1910);
Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 399, 55 S.E. 778 (1906).
Ii However,
Settle v. Southern
Ry., case
150 N.C. 643, 64 S.E. 759 (1909).
in a federal
arising in North Carolina involving injury
to plaintiff's railroad bed by rock and debris, it was held that: "There can
be no doubt.. that where one ... throws rock or debris on the property of
another, he is liable for the damage done, on the principle that he is guilty
of trespass, and quite irrespective of the question of his negligence." Asheville Constr. Co. v. Southern Ry., 19 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir. 1927).
" The court has, however, expressed doubt as to whether proof of negligence is necessary. Wiggins v. Hiawassee Valley Ry., 171 N.C. 773, 775,
89 S.E. 18, 19 (1916): "We are of opinion that there is abundant proof of
negligence (even if proof of negligence be necessary where such a trespass
is committed upon the property and rights of another) to justify the submission of the issues to the jury"; Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 393, 402, 73 S.E.
206, 210 (1911): "The plaintiff was entitled to recover damages, if the
defendant threw stones upon his land without his consent, and if he consented
to the use of the quarry [operated on defendant's adjoining tract], he could
also recover if the work was negligently done."
" Greer v. Callahan Constr. Co., 190 N.C. 632, 130 S.E. 737 (1925);

Hunter v. Southern Ry., 152 N.C. 682, 68 S.E. 237 (1910).

"'Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 393, 73 S.E. 206 (1911).
8
Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906). Other cases,
not directly involving blasting but concerning the use of explosives in general,
have stated the standard to be the highest or utmost care. Stephens v.
Blackwood Lumber Co., 191 N.C. 23, 131 S.E. 314 (1926) ; Barnett v. Cliffside Mills, 167 N.C. 576, 83 S.E. 826 (1914); Wood v. McCabe & Co., 151
N.C. 457, 66 S.E. 433 (1909). See Note, 39 N.C.L. REv. 294 (1961), which
submits that there is only one standard of care and no degrees thereof.
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ever, if the rule should emerge that proof of negligence is the preferable theory, it seems feasible that the plaintiff injured by blasting
2
should be afforded the benefit of the rule of res ipsa loquitur.' Our
court has invoked the rule in cases involving explosions other than
by blasting, 0 and there is substantial authority supporting3 1its application in concussion-vibration cases in other jurisdictions.
Should North Carolina adopt the rule of absolute liability, it can
fairly be predicted that the rule will not be reached through the
avenue of ancient reasoning derived from the common law action of
trespass quare clausum fregit that trespass to land subjects the defendant to liability regardless of fault. This is so not only because
North Carolina in the past has proceeded on the theory of negligence
rather than trespass even in cases of rock-debris invasion, but also
because recent decisions indicate that this timeworn proposition is
no longer the law in this jurisdiction. 2 In a very real sense, the
" "When the thing [which causes injury] is shown to be under the
management of the defendant ... and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation
by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 596, 601, 159 Eng. Rep. 665, 667
(Ex. 1865), quotdd with' appfoval in Harris v. Mangum, 183 N.C. 235, 238,
111 S.E. 177, 178 (1922).
" Howard v. Texas Co., 205 N.C. 20, 168 S.E. 832 (1933) (filling station); Harris v. Mangum, 183 N.C. 235, 111 S.E. 177 (1922) (boiler);
Modlin v. Simmons, 183 N.C. 63, 110 S.E. 661 (1922) (automobile); Newton
v. Texas Co., 180 N.C. 561, 105 S.E. 433 (1920) (gasoline storage plant).
" Vattilana v. George & Lynch, Inc., 154 A.2d 565 (Del. Super. Ct.
1959) ; Marlowe Constr. Co. v. Jacobs, 302 S.W.2d 612 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957) ;
Hoyt v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 69 So. 2d 546 (La. Ct. App. 1953);
Cratty v. Samuel Aceto & Co., 151 Me. 126, 116 A.2d 623 (1955); McKay
v. Kelly, 229 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
" For the modem proposition that strict liability for trespass to land derived from the common law action of trespass quare clawmum fregit is outmoded and that proof of negligence should be required where defendant's act
is unintentional, see PROSSER, TORTS § 13 (2d ed. 1955) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 166 (1938). This seems to be the law in North Carolina. In Newsom v.
Anderson, 24 N.C. 42 (1841), action in trespass quare clausum fregit was
held proper where defendant felled a tree, the top thereof falling on plaintiff's land; trespass vi et armis was held applicable where defendant, who was
beating a drum in the highway, caused plaintiff's team to run away. Loubz
v. Hafner, 12 N.C. 185 (1827). But see a later case denying recovery where
defendant's automobile left the road and crashed into plaintiff's building.
Finding the accident unavoidable, the court cited both of the above cases,
saying: "Neither shows unavoidable accident or sudden emergency but damage resulting from iiegligence. It must also be remembered that forms of
action have been abolished . . . ." Smith v. Pate, 246 N.C. 63, 66, 97
S.E.2d 457, 459 (1957). (Emphasis added.) For a recent case to the same
effect on substantially the same facts, see Schloss v. Hallman, 255 N.C. 686,
122 S.E.2d 513 (1961), discussed in 40 N.C.L. REv. 586 (1962).
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past and present state of the law prevents North Carolina from
reaching the somewhat embarrassing position of the minority rule
of applying two rules in the same jurisdiction through an adherence
to common law reasoning, i.e., that unlike rock and debris, concussion waves and earth vibrations are not direct applications of
force constituting trespass to land.

A quick reading of the decisions imposing absolute liability for
concussion and vibration damage could possibly lead to the conclusion that the rule is based upon an extension of the common law
theory of strict liability for trespass to land, i.e., that air waves
and ground vibrations are physical invasions equivalent to rock*and
debris ;33 and that, therefore, the door is closed to the'adoption of
the rule in North Carolina. A careful investigation of the cases,
however, reveals that absolute liability is really a rule founded upon
public policy which could easily be adopted by our court3 4 upon the
reasoning that the extrahazardous nature of blasting demands that
the defendant stand as an insurer of the possibility of injury, which,
in many instances, cannot be eliminated by the greatest of care.3 5
JOHN BRYAN WHITLEY

Torts-Family Purpose Doctrine-Application to Other
Instrumentalities
The family purpose doctrine has been applied by a minority of
jurisdictions in cases involving the negligent operation of automobiles furnished for the use and enjoyment of the family.' Grindstaff
"E.g., Beckstrom v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 42 Hawaii 353 (1958);
Wallace v. A. H. Guion & Co., 237 S.C. 349, 117 S.E.2d 359 (1960) ; Brown
v. L. S. Lunder Constr. Co., 240 Wis. 122, 2 N.W.2d 859 (1942).
" Recently the North Carolina Supreme Court quoted and applied RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 166 (1938), which provides: "Except where the actor
is engaged in an extrahazardous activity, an unintentional and non-negligent
entry on land in the possession of another or causing a thing or third person
to enter the land, does not subject the actor to liability to the possessor, even
though the entry causes harm to the possessor or to a thing or third person
in whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest." Schloss v.
Hallman, 255 N.C. 686, 691, 122 S.E.2d 513, 517 (1961). Quaere whether
the court will apply this rule to a non-negligent and unintentional explosion
and hold absolute liability?
"E.g., Fairfax Inn, Inc. v. Sunnyhill Mining Co., 97 F. Supp. 991 (N.D.
W. Va. 1951); Britton v. Harrison Constr. Co., 87 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.
W. Va. 1948); Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott & Watrous Eng'r Co., 137
Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591 (1951).
'E.g., Durso v. A. D. Cozzolino, Inc., 128 Conn. 24, 20 A.2d 392 (1942);
Wells v. Lockhart, 258 Ky. 698, 81 S.W.2d 5 (1935); Linch v. Dobson, 108
Neb. 632, 188 N.W. 227 (1922).
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v. Watts2 raised the question whether it applied to cases involving
the operation of motorboats. A minor child ran his father's motorboat into a boat in which plaintiff was riding. Plaintiff brought
action against both father and son for injuries received when he was
thrown into the water and struck by the boat. Both defendants
moved for nonsuit at the close of plaintiff's evidence. The father's
motion was sustained, but the son's was denied. Plaintiff appealed
the granting of the father's motion, the sole question being whether
the family purpose doctrine applied. The North Carolina Supreme
Court held that it did not apply.
It was noted that the family purpose doctrine developed as an
instrument of social policy to afford greater protection for motorists
in this country. Growing numbers of motor vehicles on our highways and the ever increasing loss of life and property demanded
protection. Liability imposed by conventional principles of agency
was thought to be inadequate.'
Although the court was aware of the "marked increase in the
use of motor-boats in recent years" 4 and that "danger to life, limb
and property from their use proportionately increased," 5 it felt that
in the absence of legislative action, the family purpose doctrine should
not be extended to instrumentalities other than motor vehicles operating on public highways.
All other jurisdictions which have been faced with the problem
of extending the doctrine to other instrumentalities are in accord
with this decision.' Two courts have refused to apply the doctrine
to bicycles negligently ridden by minor children on the ground that
bicycles did not create an alarming social problem like that created
2254 N.C. 568, 119 S.E.2d 784 (1961).

See Note, 38 N.C.L.

REv.

249 (1960).

'254 N.C. at 574, 119 S.E.2d at 784.

rIbid.

' Meinhardt v. Vaughn, 159 Tenn. 272, 17 S.W.2d 5 (1929), discussed in

Notes, 43 HARv. L. REV. 133 (1929); 8 TENN. L. REv. 44 (1929).

This case

was cited by the court in the principle case as extending the family purpose
doctrine to motorcycles. The trial court did apply the doctrine. However,
on appeal the Tennessee Supreme Court said it was not necessary to apply it
because a conventional principal and agent relationship existed.
Two cases, Lashbrook v. Patten, 62 Ky. 317 (1864), and Schaefer v.
Osterbrink, 67 Wis. 495, 30 N.W. 922 (1886), have been cited as applying
the family purpose doctrine to horse drawn vehicles before the days of automobiles. However, in both of these cases a conventional master and servant
relationship can be found. See Foster v. Farra, 117 Ore. 286, 298, 243 Pac.
778, 782 (1926); Note, 6 So. CAL. L. REv. 340, 342 (1933).
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by automobiles.7 Minnesota is the only jurisdiction, other than
North Carolina, in which the question of the application of the doctrine to motorboats had been raised.' The court in the principle
case quoted from the Minnesota case and relied upon the reasoning
of that decision. The Minnesota court stated:
Considering the wide expanse of the water surface of
our lakes and rivers and the comparatively small number of
motorboats thereon, which do not move in lanes or proscribed
routes, a situation is not presented justifying, much less requiring as a matter of public policy, the extension of the
family car doctrine to cover them.'
The family purpose doctrine is an extension of the principle of
respondeat superior and is not founded on the idea that automobiles
are inherently dangerous instrumentalities.'0 The theory of the doctrine is that some member of the family has made it his "business"
to provide an automobile for the use of himself and other members
of the family. Therefore, when a member of the family uses the
family car for his own purpose it is held that his purpose is the
"business" of the one furnishing the automobile." Logically, if
"business" is to be defined so broadly, the nature of the instrumentality should be immaterial, and the doctrine should apply to
any instrumentality furnished to members of the family for their use
and convenience. Many courts have utilized this reasoning in refusing to adopt the family purpose doctrine. One court, referring
to the Minnesota motorboat case, stated:
Minnesota says that a son driving the family car for his
own pleasure is the agent of the father.... But the son is not
Pflugmacher v. Thomas, 34 Wash. 2d 687, 209 P.2d 443 (1949) ; CalS.E.2d357,
180 241
(1944).
Ga. 703,
houn'Felcyn
v. Pair,v.197
N.W. 37 (1932), discussed in
18530Minn.
Gamble,
Notes, 16 MINN. L. REv. 870 (1932); 31 MicH. L. R-v. 132 (1932); 6 So.
CAL. L. REv. 340 (1933).
*0185 Minn. at 360, 241 N.W. at 38.
" Elliott v. Killian, 242 N.C. 471, 87 S.E.2d 903 (1955); Ewing v.
Thompson, 233 N.C. 564, 65 S.E.2d 17 (1951); Robertson v. Aldridge, 185
N.C. 292, 116 S.E. 742 (1923); Note, 38 N.C.L. REv. 249 (1960).
11In

reaching such a conclusion the court in Watkins v. Clark, 103 Kan.

629, 176 Pac. 131 (1918), said: "The deduction was facilitated by employment of the fine art of definition-putting into the definition of the term
'business' the attributes necessary to bolster up liability. So, if daughter
took her friend riding, she might think she was out purely for the pleasure
of herself and her friend, but she was mistaken; she was conducting father's
'business' as his 'agent.'" Id. at 631, 176 Pac. at 131.
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the agent of the father if it is a motorboat instead of an automobile, even though the motorboat be furnished for the pleasure of the son. When one considers contradictions such as
this, it becomes apparent that the Family Purpose Doctrine is
not as much an extension of the principles of master and1 2servant as an attempt to fix liability on one able to meet it.

Perhaps it would have been better if liability under the doctrine
had never been based on the theory of agency. If the courts had
frankly stated that public policy required the adoption of the doctrine,
they would not be haunted today by the inconsistency of their logic
when refusing to apply the doctrine to new instrumentalities. But
since social and economic considerations do not require an extension
of the doctrine to motorboats, it is submitted that the decision of the
North Carolina court in the principal case is correct.
However, it appears inconsistent to insist on legislative action
before extending the doctrine to other instrumentalities in light of
the fact that the doctrine was first adopted by the court. 13 The court
did not require such action when it was faced with the great social
impact brought about by the advent and ever increasing use of the
automobile. Certainly, if the social and economic demands, once
presented by the automobile, should call for an extension of the doctrine to other instrumentalities, the court should not fail to heed
this call.
SAMUEL S.

WOODLEY, JR.

Wills-Anti-Lapse Statutes-Adopted Children as Issue
In Headen v. Jackson' testatrix bequeathed all her property,
which consisted solely of personalty, to her four children and her
granddaughter, share and share alike. One of the children predeceased testatrix and left as her only survivor an adopted child.
After the testatrix's death the question arose whether the
adopted child could be substituted as beneficiary in his mother's place
and thereby prevent any lapse of the bequest. In a declaratory judgment action to determine the adopted child's rights, the lower court
Sare v. Stetz, 67 Wyo. 55, 74-75, 214 P.2d 486, 493 (1950), citing
DAmE LAW. 394, 396 (1941).
Note,
16 No=E
the principle case stated: "In this State [the doctrine] is
"8The
court in
not the result of legislative action, but is a rule of law adopted by the Court."
254 N.C. at 571, 119 S.E.2d at 787.
1255 N.C. 157, 120 S.E.2d 598 (1961).
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concluded that the child was not an "issue" within the meaning of
G.S. § 31-42.12 which provides,
Unless a contrary intent is indicated by the will, where a
legacy of any interest in personal property not terminable at
or before death of the legatee is given to a legatee who predeceases the testator, such legacy does not lapse but passes to
such issue of the legatee as survive the testator in all cases
where the legatee is issue of the testator or would have been
a distributee of the testator if the legatee had survived the
testator and there had been no will.
On appeal the supreme court held that the adopted child was an
"issue" within the meaning of the statute; therefore, the gift to his
mother did not lapse.' In reaching this decision the court relied
primarily upon the portion of the adoption statute which reads, "An
adopted child shall have the same legal status, including all legal
rights and obligations of any kind whatsoever, as he would have had
if he were born the legitimate child of the adoptive parent or
parents . .. ."I
The court set out a clear test5 by which the rights of adopted
children should be governed and adhered to the plain-meaning rule,6
GEN. STAT. § 31-42.1 (Supp. 1961). (Emphasis added.)
'The majority of the court seems to have misconstrued the provisions of
G.S. § 31-42.1 which provide that there should be no lapse i the bequest was
to child or other issue of the testator, or if the legatee would have been a
distributee had the testator died intestate. In its opinion, the court indicated
that even if the adopted child did not come within the term issue he could
still take the share bequeathed his mother because he would have been a
distributee of the testator had the testator died intestate. A careful reading
of the statute discloses that this provision is applicable only to the original
'N.C.

legatee and not to the person to be substituted. This fact was pointed out by
the dissent.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §48-23(a) (Supp. 1961).
"Whatever the problem is concerning an adopted child, his standing and
his legal rights can be measured by this clear test: 'What would his standing
and his rights be if he had been born to his adoptive parents at the time of
the adoption?' If lawyers and courts will look to this plain language of the
statute, and avoid making exceptions not made in this statutory statement,
persons adopting children in North Carolina can legally realize what they
have hoped for, namely that the child they adopt will become their child,
theirs fully, just as if he had been born to them, and without any exceptions
and qualifications imposed by law to thwart their purpose." A Survey of
Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1955, 33 N.C.L. Rxv. 521, 522
(1955), quoted with approval in the principal case. 255 N.C. at 159, 120
S.E.2d at 599-600.
8 "[I]f, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted
by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded, because
we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it
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in concluding that the statute left no room for interpretation other
than that the adopted child was meant to be included within the term
"issue" as found in the statute.
The result reached by our court was certainly salutary and it does
not appear to be out of line with what other jurisdictions have done
when faced with the same problem. A review of those jurisdictions
having the term "issue" in their anti-lapse statutes indicates that four
have allowed the adopted child to be included ;"three have not ;8 and
in twelve the question has never arisen.' Thus, the Headen case
aligns North Carolina with the majority of those jurisdictions which
have decided this precise question.
This interpretation also seems to be in accord with the general
view today that an adopted child should be included within the
terms child,' ° descendant," or heir," found in anti-lapse statutes.
For many years, however, the view was that the adopted child
must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision

to the case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application." Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 122, 202-03 (1819).
Flynn v. Bredbeck, 147 Ohio St. 49, 68 N.E.2d 75 (1946); Industrial
Trust Co. v. Taylor, 69 R.I. 153, 32 A.2d 269 (1943); Craft v. Blass, 8
Tenn. App. 498 (1928) ; In re Holcombe's Estate, 259 Wis. 642, 49 N.W.2d
914 (1951).

8
McLeod v. Andrews, 303 Ky. 46, 196 S.W.2d 473 (Ct. App. 1946);
Arnold v. Helmer, 327 Mass. 722, 100 N.E.2d 886 (1951); In re Russell's
Estate, 284 Pa. 164, 130 Atl. 319 (1925).
" Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia.
" Dean v. Smith, 195 Ark. 614, 113 S.W.2d 485 (1938) ; In re McEwan's
Estate, 128 N.J. Eq. 140, 15 A.2d 340 (Prerogative Ct. 1940); Smallwood
v. Smallwood, 121 N.J. Eq. 126, 186 Atl. 775 (Ct. Ch. 1936); In re Carleton's Will, 3 Misc. 2d 677, 151 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Surr. Ct. 1956); In re Horvath's Estate, 155 Misc. 734, 279 N.Y. Supp. 189 (Surr. Ct. 1935); In re
Foster's Estate, 108 Misc. 604, 177 N.Y. Supp. 827 (Surr. Ct. 1919). Contra, Crawford v. Arends, 351 Mo. 1100, 176 S.W.2d 1 (1943); In re Martin's
Will, 133 Misc. 80, 230 N.Y. Supp. 873 (Surr. Ct. 1928), holding the
adopted child did not qualify; however, in the case of In re Walter's Estate,
270 N.Y. 201, 200 N.E. 786 (1936), the court said that the holding was
inconsistent with its views and did not meet its approval. See generally
Mechem, Some Problems Arising Under Anti-Lapse Statutes, 19 IowA L.
REv. 1, 5-6 (1933).
"in re Tibbetts' Estate, 48 Cal. App. 2d 177, 119 P.2d 368 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1941); Ii re Moore's Estate, 7 Cal. App. 2d 722, 47 P.2d 533 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1935); In re Harmount's Estate, 336 Ill. App. 322, 83 N.E.2d 756
(1949); Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483, 24 Atl. 948 (1892); Hoellinger v.
Molzhon, 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217 (1950); In re Buell's Estate, 167
Ore. 295, 117 P.2d 832 (1941); See generally Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 1159
(1951). Contra, Raunch v. Metz, 212 S.W. 357 (Mo. 1919).
"2Clark v. Clark, 76 N.H. 551, 85 Atl. 758 (1913).
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should not be included within any of these terms.' 3

The principal

reason for the earlier result seems to have been the concept that
adoption created a kinship only between the parties; therefore, the
adopted child could not inherit from the collateral relatives of the
adoptive parents.1 4 Some courts, however, refused to adopt this
rationale on the ground that this limitation on the child's inheritance
was applicable only to intestacy. 5

Others concluded that the child

did not seek to take by representation, but rather by the anti-lapse
statute itself which created in the child an original right to take.16
If successful in meeting the limited inheritance argument, a court
construing the term issue would perhaps be confronted with the
problem that the blood relationship, which the term seems to connote,
cannot be artificially created by statute.' 7 The jurisdictions" which
now include the adopted child within the term issue appear to have
" See Gammons v. Gammons, 212 Mass. 454, 99 N.E. 95 (1912) (issue);
Raunch v. Metz, 212 S.W. 357 (Mo. 1919) (lineal descendants); In re
Martin's Will, 133 Misc. 80, 230 N.Y. Supp. 734 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd, 224 App.
Div. 873, 230 N.Y. Supp. 873 (1928) (child); Phillips v. McConica, 59 Ohio
St. 1, 51 N.E. 445 (1898) (issue); In re Russell's Estate, 284 Pa. 164, 130
Atl. 319 (1925) (issue).
"This argument would no longer appear to be tenable under modem
adoption statutes, which have equated the adopted and natural child with
respect to the lineal and collateral relatives of the adoptive parents. For an
excellent comparative study of inheritance rights of adopted children in all
American jurisdictions, see Note, 25 BRooxLYN L. REv. 231, 242-46 (1959).
See generally for the North Carolina view Hanft, Thwarting Adoptions, 19
N.C.L. REv. 127, 149-51 (1941).

"°In re Moore's Estate, 7 Cal. App. 2d 722, 47 P.2d 533 (Dist. Ct. App.
1935) (lineal descendants) ; In re Foster's Estate, 108 Misc. 604, 177 N.Y.
Supp. 827 (Surr. Ct. 1919) (child or descendant). Contra, In re Russell's
Estate, 284 Pa. 164, 130 Atl. 319 (1925) (issue). The court here held that
because the decedent had died testate, the status conferred upon the adopted
child under intestate circumstances could not be used to bring the child within
the term "issue" in the anti-lapse statute.
" In re Harmount's Estate, 336 Il.App. 322, 83 N.E.2d 756 (1949)
(descendant) ; Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483, 24 Atl. 948 (1892) (lineal
descendants); Hoellinger v. Molzhon, 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217 (1950)
(lineal descendant).
"?Crawford v. Arends, 351 Mo. 1100, 176 S.W.2d 1 (1943) (lineal descendants) ; Phillips v. McConica, 59 Ohio St. 1, 51 N.E. 445 (1898) (issue).
The dissenting opinion in the Headen case argued that "issue" in its ordinary
meaning meant a blood relationship existed. Accord, Barton v. Campbell,
245 N.C. 395, 95 S.E.2d 914 (1957); Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572,
75 S.E.2d 632 (1953).
"Flynn v. Bredbeck, 147 Ohio St. 49, 68 N.E.2d 75 (1946), overruling
Phillips v. McConica, 59 Ohio St. 1, 51 N.E. 445 (1898), which has arisen
under an earlier adoption statute; Harrison v. Hillegas, 13 Ohio Op. 523
(P. Ct. 1939); Graves v. Graves, 155 N.E.2d 540 (Ohio P. Ct. 1956); Industrial Trust Co. v. Taylor, 69 R.I. 153, 32 A.2d 269 (1943) ; Craft v. Blass,
8 Tenn. App. 498 (1928); In re Holcombe's Estates, 259 Wis. 642, 49
N.W.2d 914 (1951).
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abandoned strict adherence to the common law contruction of that
term. Evidently they have concluded that legislatures have power
to fix the legal status of individuals and the manner in which they
shall be treated with respect to the devolution of property.
Taking cognizance of the legislature's power in this respect,
courts faced with the question of the inclusion of adopted children
under anti-lapse statutes have relied upon adoption statutes to determine what status has been bestowed upon such children. Once
status has been determined, the courts then look to the anti-lapse
statute to determine if the child has the status required by that
statute. If it is determined that the adoption statute equates the
natural and adopted child in all respects, the courts conclude that the
adopted child must be allowed the same privilege of being substituted
for the predeceasing beneficiary as would a natural child.", Courts
following this procedure to determine an adopted child's rights to substitution necessarily consider legislative intent. In so doing, however,
they do not limit their investigation solely to the intent behind the
use of the particular term in the anti-lapse statute. Rather they construe the legislative intent in the adoption statute in conjunction
with the use of the particular term used in the anti-lapse statute to
determine what individuals were intended to be included therein.20
The majority in the Headen case adhered to the above approach
by first determining the adopted child's status under the adoption
statute and applying this determination to the anti-lapse statute.
Thus, the court refused to draw an arbitrary line of distinction between the adopted and natural child when the legislature's express
language was to the effect that no discrimination should exist.
This type of judicial attitude would seem to be clearly in accord
with the legislative intent evidenced in the adoption statute ;21 the
purpose of adoption was to give the adoptive parents a child that
would be a duplicate in all respects to a child which perhaps they
" E.g., Flynn v. Bredbeck, 147 Ohio St. 49, 68 N.E.2d 75 (1946) ; Industrial Trust Co. v. Taylor, supra note 18; In re Holcombe's Estate, supra
note 18. Contra, Arnold v. Helmer, 327 Mass. 722, 100 N.E.2d 886 (1951);
Gammons v. Gammons, 212 Mass 454, 99 N.E. 95 (1912); In re Russell's
Estate, 284 Pa. 164, 130 Atl. 319 (1925). These cases were decided on the
basis that the adoption created a relation solely between the parties to the
adoption or that the adoption statute did not sufficiently spell out that the
adopted and natural child were to be equals in all respects.
20 Cf. Craft v. Blass, 8 Tenn. App. 498 (1928)
(the two statutes being in
pari materia must be read together).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23 (Supp. 1961).
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could not naturally bear. This desired equivalence cannot be achieved
if the courts draw a line of distinction between the adopted and
natural child in the present situation.
It is hoped that the court will continue to apply the test set out in
the Headen case whenever the rights of an adopted child are in
question.2 2 However, in order to eliminate any further need for
judicial interpretation on the subject, it is submitted that the legislature incorporate this test into the adoption statute.
Such action would be a clear indication that the legislature intended to include an adopted child within the term issue whenever
used by it in any statute. It is doubtful whether the court would
force this construction of the term when found in a will.2" Fear of
trespassing on the testator's intent would be a logical basis for refusing to construe the term to include an adopted child in such case.
If this fear be a deterrent, there are yet two other alternatives which
might solve the problem.
The simplest of the two would be to replace the term "issue,"
now in the anti-lapse statute, with the term "child." It would
appear that the problem could be solved by this change in view of
the express language in the present adoption statute to the effect
that the relation of parent and child is created by the adoption,24
and recent cases holding that an adopted child comes within the term
22 Notwithstanding the fact that the decision in the Headen. case was five
to two, the dissenting Justices argued that past decisions of the court had
concluded that as far as defining the term issue in will cases the term meant
lawfully begotten heirs only. Accord, Barton v. Campbell, 245 N.C. 395,
95 S.E.2d 914 (1957); Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 75 S.E.2d 632
(1953). They further argued that since there had been a recent change in
the adoption statutes but no corresponding change in the anti-lapse statute
the legislature had not intended the adopted child to be allowed the benefit of
the latter.
2' In view of relatively late cases holding that the term issue in a will
does not include an adopted child, Barton v. Campbell, supra note 22, and
Bradford v. Johnson, supra note 22, it seems doubtful that the Headen decision will affect the term in will cases. In both of the above cases the court
concluded that, as found in a will, the term issue in its natural and ordinary
meaning meant lawfully begotten heirs of the body and that, notwithstanding
the fact an adopted child could inherit by, through and from its adoptive
parents, adoption could create only a legal relation and not one by blood.
The Headen case dealt solely with the legislative intent behind the term in
a statute and was in no way concerned with the intent of a testator. In an
analogous situation the Wisconsin Supreme Court, having previously held
that an adopted child came within the term issue as used in the anti-lapse
statute, it re Holcombe's Estate, 259 Wis. 642, 49 N.W.2d 914 (1951), refused to include an adopted child within the same term found in a will. It re
Breese's Estate, 7 Wis. 2d 422, 96 N.W.2d 712 (1959).

"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23(a) (Supp. 1961).
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children found in a will.25 Alternatively, an amendment could be
made to the present anti-lapse statute which would provide that an
adopted child is to be considered within the term "issue" as used
therein. In making such a change, the legislature would merely
indulge the presumption that the testator would have desired the
adopted child to receive equal treatment with the natural child of the
original beneficiary. In view of the fact that the anti-lapse statute
has as its basis a legislative presumption 26 that the testator would
have made provision for the predeceasing beneficiary's issue had he
known of the beneficiary's death, indulgence of this further presumption would not appear to be out of line with what has already been
done.
MACK B. PEARSALL

"E.g.,

Bullock v. Bullock, 251 N.C. 559, 111 S.E.2d 837 (1960); Wa-

chovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 239 N.C. 612, 80 S.E.2d 771 (1954).
"' "These statutes are said to be based upon the presumption that testator
would have made provision for certain relatives of the deceased beneficiary,
if his intention [sic] had been called to the death of the beneficiary, and he
had had the opportunity to make such provision." 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1422, at
176 (Lifetime ed. 1941).

